How to Make the Terrorism Supply Curve Vertical...and Move It Left
Wow, I am on a roll. I was talking income inequality here just before the topic had a brief mini-boomlet.
Now Greg Mankiw is noting some economics work on the relative value of human capital applied to the activity of terrorism. Where have I heard this before? Let's expand the theme a little. Given this continuum of productivity we can infer that the incidence, or supply, of large scale terrorism such as 9/11 is relatively inelastic, in that only skilled and seasoned terrorist with broad experience in navigating various international law enforcement and administrative barriers can perpetrate something on the order of 9/11 and that it takes time for such terrorists to achieve this level of capability. So it takes time to actually supply large scale terrorism, even though the value of it (to a terrorist) might be calling for it immediately. Elevating those barriers through a series of actions that tighten and enlarge the enforcement and administrative superstructure, colloquially known as the "war on terror," can only increase the inelasticity of supply of large scale terrorism (make the supply curve of grand-scale terrorism more vertical). Furthermore, by targeting the senior leadership and most highly trained terrorists, we shift that nicely vertical curve to the left - as the most productive terrorist elements cease to operate the overall level of terrorism supplied must fall.
The conclusion that this analysis should lead us to, and that I and others have stated, is this: low productivity terrorists should be of low concern to us. Some 19 year old illiterate thug from Jeddah making his way to Iraq to fight means little to us and his presence should not enter into our planning all that much. The killing or capture of high level terrorists should constitute the bulk of our resources. (Naturally this seems obvious, but that is why we have the 'science' of economics, to convey the obvious in a way that conveys some notion of analytical rigor.) The recent revelations about our capture and interrogation of leading al Qaeda figures can only be viewed as a positive reflection on the way we have approached terrorism. The most logical response from Congress would be to implement laws and procedures that further enable this sort of activity. sadly this doesn't seem to be the case. If I was a staunch opponent of the Iraq war and was looking to 'support the troops by bringing them home' I would advocate wider latitude for terrorist surveillance. More wire-tapping and SWIFT monitoring would surely reduce the need to be chasing low level terrorists around the deserts of Iraq. Sadly, that doesn't seem to be the case either.
Now Greg Mankiw is noting some economics work on the relative value of human capital applied to the activity of terrorism. Where have I heard this before? Let's expand the theme a little. Given this continuum of productivity we can infer that the incidence, or supply, of large scale terrorism such as 9/11 is relatively inelastic, in that only skilled and seasoned terrorist with broad experience in navigating various international law enforcement and administrative barriers can perpetrate something on the order of 9/11 and that it takes time for such terrorists to achieve this level of capability. So it takes time to actually supply large scale terrorism, even though the value of it (to a terrorist) might be calling for it immediately. Elevating those barriers through a series of actions that tighten and enlarge the enforcement and administrative superstructure, colloquially known as the "war on terror," can only increase the inelasticity of supply of large scale terrorism (make the supply curve of grand-scale terrorism more vertical). Furthermore, by targeting the senior leadership and most highly trained terrorists, we shift that nicely vertical curve to the left - as the most productive terrorist elements cease to operate the overall level of terrorism supplied must fall.
The conclusion that this analysis should lead us to, and that I and others have stated, is this: low productivity terrorists should be of low concern to us. Some 19 year old illiterate thug from Jeddah making his way to Iraq to fight means little to us and his presence should not enter into our planning all that much. The killing or capture of high level terrorists should constitute the bulk of our resources. (Naturally this seems obvious, but that is why we have the 'science' of economics, to convey the obvious in a way that conveys some notion of analytical rigor.) The recent revelations about our capture and interrogation of leading al Qaeda figures can only be viewed as a positive reflection on the way we have approached terrorism. The most logical response from Congress would be to implement laws and procedures that further enable this sort of activity. sadly this doesn't seem to be the case. If I was a staunch opponent of the Iraq war and was looking to 'support the troops by bringing them home' I would advocate wider latitude for terrorist surveillance. More wire-tapping and SWIFT monitoring would surely reduce the need to be chasing low level terrorists around the deserts of Iraq. Sadly, that doesn't seem to be the case either.
posted by Donny Baseball at 9:01 AM
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